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From	the	Social	Market	Economy	to	the	National
Partnership:	The	conflict	elite	and	public-private
partnerships	in	a	post-war	Syria
by	Dr.	Samer	Abboud
This	article	was	originally	a	delivered	at	the	Conflict	Research	Programme’s	‘Political	Economy	and	Governance	in
Syria’	conference	in	December	2018.
Marota	City,	Syria:	Construction	work	at	the	site	of	Marota	City	project.	One	of	the	projects	of
Cham	Holding.	The	land	of	the	project	was	occupied	by	informal	houses-	some	of	which
could	be	seen	in	the	background.	Source:	Marota	City	website.
The	current	state	of	the	Syrian	conflict	has	turned	our	collective	attention	to	questions	of	reconstruction,	despite	the
absence	of	a	formalised	peace	process	or	political	negotiations.	The	Syrian	post-war	order	is	not	being	shaped	by
a	liberal	peace	imposed	from	the	outside	by	multilateral	powers,	nor	a	negotiated	peace	that	emerged	from	within
the	country	through	negotiations	between	various	factions.	Instead,	what	is	emerging	in	Syria	–	drawing	from	the
work	of	David	Lewis	–	is	an	‘authoritarian	peace’	in	which	perpetual	violence,	the	persistence	of	enmity,	and	forms
of	social	and	political	erasure	underpin	the	post-war	order.	It	is	through	this	interpretative	framework	and	its
materialisation	on	the	ground	that	I	believe	we	need	to	think	about	Syria’s	current	and	future	political	economy.
This	article	is	intended	to	show	a	specific	trajectory	in	relation	to	the	conflict	and	to	demonstrate	how	the	policies	of
the	2000s	laid	the	groundwork	for	a	sliver	of	the	reconstruction	approach	that	is	manifest	in	Syria	today.	As	far	as
anyone	can	tell,	in	the	absence	of	a	blueprint	or	a	master	plan	for	reconstruction,	the	main	approach	to
reconstruction	in	Syria	is	not	one	based	on	specific	policies,	or	on	institutional	development,	or	even	one	that	relies
on	privileging	some	sectors	over	others.	But	rather,	it	is	an	approach	that	centralises	public-private	partnerships
(PPP)	as	the	core	mechanism	through	which	to	attract	capital	and	to	achieve	reconstruction	ends.	The	groundwork
for	such	an	approach	was	laid	prior	to	the	conflict.	As	I	claim	throughout	this	article,	the	PPP	strategy	allows	for	the
transition	of	a	new	strata	of	the	business	community	that	emerged	after	2011	to	transition	away	from	being
intermediaries	in	a	conflict	economy	to	playing	more	productive	roles.	So,	while	I	am	tracing	this	shift	from	the
Social	Market	Economy	to	the	National	Partnership,	I	am	simultaneously	tracing	the	ways	in	which	a	conflict	elite
has	emerged	in	relation	to	violence,	and	how	it	is	being	integrated	into	the	emerging	reconstruction	strategies	of	the
regime.
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I	will	first	briefly	take	us	through	the	two	economic	strategies,	then	discuss	the	processes	that	have	given	rise	to	a
new	conflict	elite	whose	central	role	emerged	out	of	the	need	for	distributive	and	financial	intermediation.	I	conclude
by	bringing	these	discussions	together.
I	want	to	stress	that	when	I	talk	about	the	Social	Market	Economy	and	the	National	Partnership	I	am	not	taking
them	as	a	coherent	set	of	policies	but	as	a	kind	of	political	rationality	as	a	way	of	talking	about	and	thinking	about
the	economy.
The	Social	Market	Economy	was	a	strategy	promulgated	at	the	10th	Ba’ath	Party	Regional	Conference	in	2005	that
gave	a	name	to	liberalising	measures	that	began	much	earlier,	in	the	1986	and	the	1990s,	and	were	accelerated	in
the	early	2000s.	The	Syrian	approach	to	liberalisation	and	privatisation,	however,	was	not	premised	on	the	transfer
of	assets	from	the	public	to	private	sector,	but	rather,	through	the	expansion	of	markets	to	facilitate	the	entry	of
private	capital	into	the	economy.	Thus,	for	example,	banks	were	not	sold	off	but	rules	were	relaxed	so	that	private
banks	could	operate	in	the	country.	The	same	could	be	said	in	most	areas	of	the	economy,	from	insurance	to	higher
education,	that	were	effectively	marketised	rather	than	privatised.	In	theory,	the	public	sector	would	continue	to
operate	alongside	an	expanding	private	sector	made	up	of	diasporic	and	national	Syrians	as	well	as	regional	private
actors.	The	strategy	sought	to	link	Syria	to	the	flowing	circuits	of	Gulf	and	Eastern	capital	that	were	being	invested
in	growing	numbers	during	the	2000s.	The	role	of	the	state	was	imagined	as	a	protector	of	society	from	the	negative
costs	of	marketisation,	hence	the	marshalling	of	the	social	label.
The	policies	of	the	2000s	created	new	elements	within	the	business	class	and	provided	new	opportunities	for	the
expansion	and	wealth	accumulation	of	the	networks	Dr	Bassam	Haddad	talks	about	in	his	Business	Networks	in
Syria	book.	Of	interest	are	the	developments	in	the	latter	part	of	the	decade	when	two	holding	companies	were
created,	Cham	and	Souria.	Similar	to	the	Chambers,	they	represented	an	institutionalisation	of	a	certain	kind	of
business	interest,	an	amalgamation	of	interests,	assets,	and	power.	Many	people	believed	that	these	companies
were	politically	relevant	but	economically	irrelevant,	that	is	that	they	were	small	at	that	time	and	were	not	doing	very
much.	Today,	I	believe	that	the	situation	has	changed	and	that	they	are	relevant	in	both	ways.
Interestingly,	when	the	holding	companies	were	started	they	were	limited	in	their	activities	but	soon,	prior	to	the
outbreak	of	conflict,	they	were	swallowing	up	major	government	contracts,	including	large	infrastructure	projects.
This	led	to	the	creation	of	a	new	public-private	partnership	law	to	facilitate	and	legalise	the	procurement	system	and
to	privilege	these	new	partnerships	within	an	evolving	economic	strategy.	Within	a	few	short	years,	power	plant
projects,	major	national	highways	covering	the	entirety	of	Syrian	territory,	an	urban	metro	network	in	Damascus	and
new	airports	were	all	projects	that	were	to	be	realised	through	PPPs.	The	passing	of	public-private	partnership	laws
coincided	with	laws	passed	throughout	Syria’s	various	ministries	eliminating	public	sector	monopolies	on	major
projects,	including	electricity	and	transportation,	thus	displacing	the	central	role	of	the	public	sector	in	major	national
works.	Within	this	framework,	the	role	of	the	public	was	not	merely	as	a	partner	to	private	capital	but	also	as	a
facilitator	of	land	transfer,	tax	exemptions,	and	so	on.
Thus,	there	were	many	changes	happening	with	the	business	networks	and	within	the	business	community	as	a
whole	prior	to	the	outbreak	of	conflict.	There	are	three	broad	changes	that	have	accelerated	the	transformation	of
the	Syrian	business	community	in	the	context	of	the	conflict	and	the	emergence	of	a	conflict	elite	after	2011:
economic	contraction,	international	sanctions,	and	capital	flight.
It	is	in	this	broader	context	that	Syria’s	war	economies	emerge	and	which	provided	the	conditions	for	the
emergence	of	what	I	refer	to	as	the	‘conflict	elite’,	specifically	distinguishable	from	other	profiteers	and	war
beneficiaries.	Generally	speaking,	the	conflict	elite	are	individuals	or	small	networks	that	operated	predominantly	in
regime	areas	and	who	have	been	central	to	the	regime’s	shifting	modes	of	economic	governance	during	the
conflict,	especially	concerning	attempts	to	evade	sanctions.	These	elites	are	not	necessarily	linked	to	the	regime
through	familial	or	social	linkages	but	instead	through	a	system	of	mutual	benefit	and	interdependency	in	which	the
regime	has	been	forced	to	cultivate	and	rely	on	them	to	stimulate	economic	activity.	Their	importance	emerged	in
so	far	as	they	linked	their	activity	–	such	as	procurement	from	the	outside	or	transportation	–	to	the	needs	of	the
battlefield.	In	some	cases,	they	have	taken	up	leadership	positions	in	various	Chambers	(such	as	the	Damascus
Chambers	of	Commerce	and	the	Damascus	Chamber	of	Industry)	and	other	bodies.
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To	stress,	as	the	conflict	dragged	on,	the	dual	impact	of	sanctions	and	capital	flight	meant	that	many	people	on	the
boards	of	these	Chambers’	either	resigned	or	fled	the	country.	In	2012,	every	single	member	of	Cham	Holding’s
board	was	under	US	sanctions,	so	they	resigned	and	were	replaced	by	an	entirely	new	crop	of	people	outside	of
the	sanctions	regime.	This	the	crux	of	what	I	am	talking	about	–
the	process	of	how	the	sanctions	created	this	need	to	have	a	new
kind	of	elite.	Years	later,	internal	rules	within	the	Chambers	led	to
the	dismissal	of	chamber	members	who	had	fled	the	country	and
their	replacement	by	some	of	these	new	elite.
Unlike	the	upper	strata	of	the	pre-conflict	business	class	who	are
primarily	involved	in	the	formal	economy	such	as	in	production,
services,	and	trade,	the	conflict	elites	functioned	as	intermediaries
and	facilitators	to	ensure	that	goods	can	be	brought	to	regime
areas.	This	role	is	a	function	both	of	the	conflict	elites’	lack	of
investment	capital	and	of	the	specific	opportunities	afforded	them
during	the	conflict.	And	while	they	may	have	lacked	the	wealth
and	investment	capacity	of	other	elites,	their	presence	in	the
country	and	their	access	to	the	political	and	security	apparatus
made	them	important	actors.
They	generally	come	from	varied	social	and	economic	backgrounds	and	have	not	displayed	any	tendencies	toward
autonomous	collective	representation.	In	other	words,	they	remain	fragmented	and	lack	the	cohesion	or	interest	to
act	in	a	unified	autonomous	way	but	have	rather	sought	to	integrate	within	existing	modes	of	representation	or
within	new	bodies	such	as	the	Syrian	Metals	and	Steel	Council	that	was	formed	during	the	conflict.	Generally
speaking,	they	tend	to	have	emerged	from	two	different	situations:	first,	those	who	owned	small	or	medium-sized
enterprises	prior	to	the	conflict	and	chose	not	to	divest	of	their	assets	and	leave	the	country,	and	second,	private-	or
public-sector	managers	who	had	established	enterprises	during	the	conflict.	One	of	the	key	factors	driving	their
formation	is	their	relationship	with	regime	officials,	especially	from	within	the	security	apparatus.	Their	central	role
began	as	one	of	intermediation.
I	stress	intermediation	here	in	contrast	to	the	extractive	role	that	we	may	think	of	other	actors	as	playing.	I	would
consider,	for	example,	activities	as	kidnapping,	looting,	taxation,	and	so	on,	as	extractive,	short-term,	and
unsustainable	activity	that	is	underpinned	by	violence.	In	contrast,	intermediaries	were	implicated	in	the	violent
economies	but	not	directly	guiding	it.	As	such,	they	were	well	positioned	to	facilitate	transactions,	evade	sanctions,
serve	as	fronts	for	the	existing	elites,	and	so	on.
How,	then,	is	the	emergence	of	the	conflict	elite	relevant	to	the	discussion	of	the	National	Partnership	and	to	the
question	of	public	private	partnerships	more	broadly?
The	National	Partnership	was	promulgated	in	2016	and	with	it	the	end	of	the	Social	Market	Economy.	Far	from
being	a	policy	blueprint	for	reconstruction,	the	National	Partnership	represents	an	approach	to	reconstruction	that
builds	on	some	of	the	main	marketising	and	privatising	elements	of	pre-conflict	economic	policy	through	the
centralisation	of	public-private	partnerships	as	the	core	approach	to	reconstruction.	Again,	to	stress,	this	is	an	idea
and	an	approach,	not	a	coherent	set	of	policies.	But	as	an	idea	it	indicates	the	central	role	that	private	capital	will
play	in	Syria’s	reconstruction.	This	is	not	simply	because	of	the	obvious	government	fiscal	problems,	but	part	of	a
trend	in	Syria	state	formation	since	the	2000s	to	shift	and	open	up	spaces	for	capital	accumulation	within	the
business	community.	The	final	frontier,	so	to	speak,	was	always	large-scale	public	works,	and	the	conflict’s
transformations	have	shattered	that	border	and	opened	up	all	areas	of	the	economy	to	private	investment.	Through
this	framework,	the	state	commits	itself	to	a	transfer	of	wealth	and	assets	under	the	guise	of	reconstruction.	I	should
say	parenthetically	that	there	is	no	specific	model	for	PPP,	it	could	be	public	capital	or	private	capital	but	in	the
Syrian	case	I	believe	that	the	state’s	role	as	a	partner	is	to	facilitate	these	kinds	of	transfers.
For	the	conflict	elite,	the	PPPs	give	them	a	way	to	connect	with	existing	capital	networks	and	to	shift	from	the	role	of
intermediation	to	deeper	roles	in	the	economy.	In	many	ways,	the	conflict	elite	became	so	because	of	their	ability	to
intermediate	in	conditions	of	violence.	Now,	the	National	Partnership	is	a	way	to	bring	them	into	the	existing	capital
networks.
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To	conclude,	the	National	Partnership	is	reflective	both	of	contemporary	processes	of	state	formation	and	the	social
transformations	wrought	by	the	conflict.	Syria’s	authoritarian	peace	leaves	long-term	questions	of	reconstruction
largely	peripheral	and	the	possibility	of	a	comprehensive,	socially-grounded	reconstruction	program	virtually	nil.	In
other	words,	the	kind	of	comprehensive	liberal	peace	that	is	imagined	in	many	of	the	discussions	about	Syria	will
not	happen.	Indeed,	when	I	was	in	contact	with	a	Syrian	economist	recently	and	asked	him	about	all	of	the	policy
documents	being	produced	in	the	West	about	Syrian	reconstruction	his	response	was	blunt	but	very	informative:
“nobody	in	Damascus	is	talking	about	this”.		Instead,	what	has	emerged	is	a	strategic	approach	to	reconstruction
that	is	premised	on	attracting	and	circulating	capital	into	the	economy	through	public-private	partnerships,	a
strategy	that	both	extends	processes	of	state	formation	prior	to	the	conflict	and	incorporates	new	sources	of	power
in	the	form	of	the	conflict	elite.
Note:	The	CRP	blogs	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	the	Conflict	Research	Programme,	the
London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science,	or	the	UK	Government.
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